17 Race and Globalization

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Theorizing Racism

While there is no legitimate biological basis for dividing the world into racial groupings, *race* is so fundamental a sociopolitical category that it is impossible to think about any aspect of globalization without focusing on the "fatal coupling of power and difference" (Hall 1992) signified by *racism*.[1] Racism is the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies. Wherever in the world the reader encounters this chapter, she will have some knowledge of racism's everyday and extraordinary violences; she will also be sensible of the widening circulation of cultural, aesthetic, and oppositional practices that subjectively mark the difference race makes. For the purposes of this chapter political economy is primary, because so much of globalization concerns material changes in ordinary people's capacities to make their way in the world. Therefore, by emphasizing racism, the next few pages examine how race is a modality through which political–economic globalization is lived (cf., Hall 1980). A case study of the United States demonstrates how the conjuncture of globalization, legitimate-state limits, and white supremacy reorganizes and contains power through criminalization and imprisonment. These significant political practices, while devised and tested behind the sturdy curtain of racism, have broad national and global articulations – connections not impeded by racialized boundaries (Gilmore 1998; Gordon 1988). The purpose of focusing on the US in this chapter is not to study an "average" much less "original" racism, but rather to consider how fatal couplings of power and difference in one place develop and change. Then we will consider how they connect with, are amplified by, and materially affect, modalities of globalization elsewhere.

Why should race so vex the planet? Variations in humankind can be regarded in many ways, as contemporary genetics demonstrates (Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984). However, the coupling of European colonialism's economic imperatives – expansion, exploitation, inequality – with

European modernity's cultural emphasis on the visible (Berger 1980) produced a powerful political belief that underlies racialization. The belief can be summed up this way: What counts as difference to the eye transparently embodies explanation for other kinds of differences, and exceptions to such embodied explanation reinforce rather than undermine dominant epistemologies of inequality (Gilroy 2000). Geographers from Linnaeus forward have figured centrally in the production of race as an object to be known, in part because historically one of the discipline's motive forces has been to describe the visible world (Livingstone 1992).

To describe is also to produce. While any number of "first contact" texts show that in fact "all cultures are contact cultures" (Williams 1992), the powerful concept of a hierarchy of fixed differences displaced both elite and common knowledges of an alternatively globalized world (Blaut 1994; Lewis 1982; Mudimbe 1988). For example, in the mid-fifteenth century, Azurara, court historian to Henry the Navigator (intellectual and financial author of Europe's African slave trade), noted how many in the first group of human cargo corraled at Lisbon strongly resembled then-contemporary Portuguese; indeed, the captives' sole shared feature was their grievously wept desire to go home (Sanders 1978).

The triumph of hierarchy required coercive and persuasive forces to coalesce in the service of domination (Said 1993). While European militarization constituted the key force that produced and maintained fatally organized couplings of power and difference, Catholic and Protestant missionaries explained and reinforced hierarchical human organization in terms of God-given ineffable processes and eternally guaranteed outcomes (Stannard 1992). National academies – precursors to today's colleges and universities – codified the social world in stringently insulated disciplines which further obscured the world's interconnections (Wallerstein 1989; Bartov 1996).

In the long, murderous twentieth century, geographers used three main frameworks to study race: environmental determinism (see Mitchell 2000), areal differentiation (see Harvey 1969), and social construction (e.g., Jackson and Penrose 1993; Kobayashi and Peake 1994; Gilmore 1999, 2002; Liu 2000). The variety of frameworks, and the fact of transition from one to another, demonstrates both how geography has been deeply implicated in the development of inequality, and how critical disciplinary reconstruction at times seeks to identify and remedy the social effects of intellectual wrongs. In other words, frameworks – or "paradigms" (Kuhn 1996) – are not structures that emerge with spontaneous accuracy in the context of knowledge production. Rather, they are politically and socially as well as empirically contingent and contested explanations for how things work that, once widely adopted, are difficult to disinherit.

Geographers who embraced environmental determinism sought to explain domination and subordination – power and difference in terms of groups' relative life-chances – by reference to the allegedly formative climates and landscapes of conqueror and conquered. The framework assumed,

and therefore persistently demonstrated, that inequality is a product of natural rather than sociopolitical capacities; while culture might revise, it can never fully correct (e.g., Huntington 1924). In this view inequality is irremediable, and thus should be exploited or erased. Examples of exploitation and erasure include US and South African apartheid, the Third Reich's "Final Solution," scorched-earth wars against Central American indigenous groupings, and other cleansing schemes.

As if in recognition of environmental determinism's horrifying social consequences, the second framework, areal differentiation, seized the seemingly unbiased tools of the quantitative revolution to map distributions of difference across landscapes. The areal approach featured a mild curiosity toward the political–economic origins of inequalities, by suggesting causes for certain kinds of spatial mismatches or overlays. But in the end, taking race as a given, and development as the proper project for social change, the approach described territorialized objects (people and places as if they were things) rather than sociospatial processes (how people and places came to be organized as they are) (Gilmore 2002).

Inquiry into processes shapes a prevalent critical geographical framework. Neither voluntaristic nor idealistic, social construction refuses to naturalize race, even while recognizing its sociospatial and ideological materiality. At its relational best, the social construction approach considers how racialization is based in the (until recently) underanalyzed production of both masculinity and whiteness (foundation and byproduct of global European hegemony), and how, therefore, race and space are mutually constituted (Ware 1992; Pulido 2000).[2] How do spatially specific relations of power and difference – legal, political, cultural – racialize bodies, groupings, activities, and places? Why are such relations reproducible? For example, how is it that globally dynamic interactions, organized according to liberal theories of individual sovereignty, protection, grievance, and remedy ("human rights"), reconfigure but do not dismantle planetary white male supremacy – as measured by multinational corporate ownership, effective control over finance capital, and national military killing capacity?

While the three approaches span a wide political spectrum, from racist eugenics to anti-racist multiculturalism and beyond, all, at least implicitly, share two assumptions: (1) societies are structured in dominance within and across scales; and (2) race is in some way determinate of sociospatial location (Hall 1980). A way to understand the first point is to think about all the components – or institutions – of a society at any scale, and then ask about differences of power within and between them. Are corporations stronger than labor unions? Do poor families rank equally with wealthy ones? Does education receive the same kind of financial and political support, or command the same attention to demands, as police or the military? Do small food producers enjoy the same protections and opportunities as agribusinesses? Are industrial pollutants and other toxic wastes spread evenly across the landscape? Do those who produce toxins pay to contain them? Are people tried in

courts by juries of their peers? Having thought about these kinds of institutional relationships, turn to the second assumption: According to the society's official or commonsense classifications, how does race figure in and between the institutions?[3] While this thought-experiment is only a crude cross-section, the conclusions suggest strongly that – as all the twentieth-century frameworks agree – race, while slippery, is also structural.

But what structures does race make? Let us turn the question inside out, and ask how might fatal couplings of power and difference be globally represented. Any map of modernity's fundamental features – growth, industrialization, articulation, urbanization, and inequality – as measured by wealth, will also map historical–geographical racisms. Such a map is the product of rounds and rounds of globalization, five centuries' movement of people, commodities, and people *as* commodities, along with ideologies and political forms, forever commingled by terror, syncretism, truce, and sometimes love. The cumulative effects of worldwide colonialism, transatlantic slavery, Western hemisphere genocide, and postcolonial imperialism – plus ongoing opposition to these effects – appear today, on any adequate planetary map of the twenty-first century, as power-differerence topographies (e.g., North, South) unified by the ineluctable fatalities attending asymmetrical wealth transfers.

So far the discussion is pitched at a general level of abstraction. Our map of contemporary globalization circulation models (GCMs) is built on the historical geographies of past GCMs, and signifies underlying struggles that indicate global warming of a peculiar kind. Indubitably anthropogenic, the racialized heat of political–economic antagonisms sheds light on the forms of organized abandonment that constitute the other side of globalism's uneven development coin (Smith 1990): structural adjustment, environmental degradation, privatization, genetic modification, land expropriation, forced sterilization, human organ theft, neocolonialism, involuntary and super-exploited labor.

At the same time, the realities of racism are not the same everywhere, and represent different practices at different geographical scales – which are connected (or "articulated") in many ways (see, for example, Pred 2000). Within and across scales – respectively configuring nation-states, productive regions, labor markets, communities, households, and bodies (Smith 1992) – anti-racist activism encounters supple enactments and renewals of racialization through law, policy, and legal and illegal practices performed by state and non-state actors. The key point is this: at any scale, racism is not a lagging indicator, an anachronistic drag on an otherwise achievable social equality guaranteed by the impersonal freedom of expanding markets. History is not a long march from premodern racism to postmodern pluralism (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000). Rather, racism's changing same does triple duty: claims of *natural* or *cultural* incommensurabilities secure conditions for reproducing *economic* inequalities, which then validate theories of extra-economic hierarchical difference. In other words, racism func-

tions as a limiting force that pushes disproportionate costs of participating in an increasingly monetized and profit-driven world onto those who, due to the frictions of *political* distance, cannot reach the variable levers of power that might relieve them of those costs.[4]

What is the character of such friction? Why is the cost of mobility so prohibitive for some, especially in the current period that is colloquially characterized by increased – some say *hyper* – mobilities? Race and racism are historical and specific, cumulative and territorially distinct – although distinct does not mean either isolated or unique. But while already-existing *material inequality* shapes political landscapes, the contested grounds are also *ideological*, because how we understand and make sense of the world and ourselves in it shapes how we do what we do (Donald and Hall 1986). In any society, those who dominate produce *normative* primary definitions of human worth through academic study, laws, and the applied activities of medical and other "experts," as well as through schooling, news, entertainment, and other means of mass education (Omi and Winant 1986; Bartov 1996; Chinn 2000). Those who are dominated produce counter-definitions which, except in extraordinary moments of crisis, are structurally secondary to primary definitions. While such counter-definitions might constitute "local" common sense, their representation in the wider ideological field is as sporadically amplified *responses* to regional norms – rather than as the fundamental terms of debate (Hall 1978). On all fronts, then, racism always means struggle. Whether radically revolutionary or minimally reformist, anti-racism is fought from many different kinds of positions, rather than between two teams faced off on a flat, featureless plain. Indeed, organized and unorganized anti-racist struggle is a feature of everyday life, and the development and reproduction of collective oppositional capacities bear opportunity costs which, in a peculiar limit to fiscal metaphor, are hard to transfer *collectively* to other purposes within "already partitioned" political geographies (Smith 1992: 66). Therefore, if, as many activist-theorists note, coercion is expensive (e.g., Fanon 1961), anti-coercion cannot be cheap.

The deepening divide between the hyper-mobile and the friction-fixed produces something that would not surprise Albert Einstein: depending on their sociospatial location in the global political economy, certain people are likely to experience "time-space compression" (Harvey 1989) as time-space *expansion*. We shall now turn to a case study of the United States to see how intensified criminalization and imprisonment constitute such an expansion, and then conclude by considering some global effects of US anti-Black racism. The reader must bear in mind that US racism is not the model but rather the case, and that US racism is not singularly anti-Black; the larger point, then, is to consider both how racism is produced through, and informs the territorial, legal, social, and philosophical organization of a place, and also how racism fatally articulates with other power-difference couplings such that its effects can be amplified beyond a place even if its structures remain particular and local.

Prison and Globalization

Ever since Richard M. Nixon's 1968 campaign for US president on a "law and order" platform, the US has been home to a pulsing moral panic over crime. Between 1980 and 2000 the "law and order" putsch swelled prisons and jails with 1.68 million people, so that today 2,000,000 women, men, boys, and girls live in cages.[5] The US rate of imprisonment is the highest in the world (Gainsborough and Mauer 2000). African-Americans and Latinos comprise two-thirds of the prison population; 7 percent are women of all races. Almost half the prisoners had steady employment before they were arrested, while upwards of 80 percent were at some time represented by state-appointed lawyers for the indigent: in short, as a class, convicts are the working or workless poor. Why did "the law" enmesh so many people so quickly, but delay casting its dragnet for a decade after Nixon's successful bid for the presidency?

The 1938–68 World War II and Cold War military buildup produced a territorial redistribution of wealth from the urban industrialized northeast and north central to the agricultural and resource dominated south and coastal west (Hooks 1991; Markusen et al. 1991). While one urban–rural wealth gap was narrowed by state-funded military development, the equalization of wealth between regions masked deepening inequalities *within* regions as measured in both racial and urban–rural terms (Schulman 1994; Gilmore 1998).

Military Keynesianism characterized the US version of a *welfare* state: the enormous outlays and consequent multipliers for inventing, producing, and staffing *warfare* capacities underwrote modest social protections against calamity and opportunities for advancement. Prior to the military buildup, the New Deal US developed social welfare capacities, the design of which were objects of fierce interregional struggle (Egerton 1995). In concert with the successful political struggle by the Union's most rigorously codified *and* terrorist white supremacist regimes (Ginzburg 1962; McWilliams 1939) to make the south and west principal sites for military agglomeration, the federal government also expanded to the national scale – via the structure of welfare programs – particular racial and gender inequalities.[6] As a result, under the New Deal white people fared better than people of color; women had to apply for individually what men received as entitlements; and urban industrial workers secured limited labor rights denied agricultural and household workers (Gordon 1994; Edid 1994).

The welfare–warfare state (O'Connor 1973 – another way to think of "military Keynesianism") was first and foremost a safety net for the capital class as a whole (Negri 1988) in all major areas: collective investment, labor division and control, comparative regional and sectoral advantage, national consumer market integration, and global reach. Up until 1967–8 the capital class paid high taxes for such extensive insurance (Gilmore forthcoming). But in the mid-1960s the rate of profit, which had climbed for nearly thirty

years, began to drop off. Large corporations and banks, anxious about the flattening profit curve, began to agitate forcefully and successfully to reduce their taxes. Capital's tax revolts, fought out in federal and state legislatures, and at the Federal Reserve Bank, provoked the decline of military Keynesianism (Dickens 1996). The primary definers of the system's demise laid responsibility at the door of unruly people of color, rather than in the halls of capital – where overdevelopment of productive capacity weighed against future earnings (Brenner 2001) and therefore demanded a new relation with labor mediated by the state.

The 1968 law and order campaign was part of a successful "southern strategy" aimed at bringing white-supremacist Democrats from *anywhere* into the Republican fold (see, for example, McGirr 2001). Mid-1960s radical activism – both spontaneous and organized – had successfully produced widespread disorder throughout society. The ascendant right used the fact of disorder to persuade voters that the incumbents failed to govern. The claim accurately described objective conditions. But in order to exploit the evidence for political gain, the right had to interpret the turmoil as something they could contain, if elected, using already-existing, unexceptionable capacities: the power to defend the nation against enemies foreign and domestic. And so the *contemporary* US crime problem was born, in the context of solidifying the political incorporation of the militarized south and west into a broadening anti-New Deal conservatism. The disorder that became "crime" had particular urban and racial qualities, and the collective characteristics of activists – whose relative visibility as enemies inversely reflected their structural powerlessness – defined the face of the individual criminal. To deepen its claims, the right assigned the welfare–warfare state's *social* project institutional responsibility for the anxiety and upheaval of the period.

The postwar liberation movement focused in part on extending eligibility to those who had been deliberately excluded from New Deal legislation. While some factions of the civil rights movement worked to bring about simple inclusion, radical African, Latino, Asian, and Native American groupings fought the many ways the state at all scales organized poor people's perpetual dispossession (Jones 1992). Radical white activists both aligned with people of color and launched autonomous attacks against symbols and strongholds of US capitalism, and Euro-American racism and imperialism.

Indeed, growing opposition to the US war in Southeast Asia helped forge one international community of resistance. At the same time, activism against colonialism and apartheid on a world scale found in Black Power a compelling renewal of linkages between "First" and "Third World" Pan African and other liberation struggles (James 1980). Meanwhile, students and workers built and defended barricades from Mexico City to Paris: no sooner had smoke cleared in one place than fires of revolt flared up in another. The more that militant anti-capitalism and international solidarity became

everyday features of US *anti-racist activism*, the more vehemently the state and its avatars responded by "individualizing disorder" (Feldman 1991: 109) into singular instances of criminality – that could then be solved via arrest or state-sanctioned killings.

Both institutional and individualized condemnation were essential, because the deadly anti-racist struggle had been nationally televised. Television affected the outlook of ordinary US white people who had to be persuaded that welfare did not help them (it did), and that justice should be measured by punishing individuals rather than via social reconstruction (Gilmore 1991). Thus, the political will for *militarism* remained intact, but the will for *equity* (another way to think about welfare), however weak it had been, yielded to pressure for privatizing or eliminating public – or social – goods and services. In other words, the basic structure of the postwar US racial state (Omi and Winant 1986) has shifted, from welfare–warfare to workfare–warfare, and that shift is the product of, and is producing, a new political as well as economic geography.

The expansion of prison coincides with this fundamental shift, and constitutes a geographical solution to socioeconomic problems, politically organized by the state which is, itself, in the process of radical restructuring. This view brings the complexities and contradictions of globalization to the fore, by showing how already-existing social, political, and economic relations constitute the conditions of possibility (but not inevitability) for ways to solve major problems. In the present case, "major problems" appear, materially and ideologically, as surpluses of finance capital, land, labor, and state capacity that have accumulated from a series of overlapping and interlocking crises stretching across three decades.

In the wake of capital's tax revolt, and the state's first movements toward restructing both capital–labor and international economic relations, the US slipped into the long mid-1970s recession. Inflation consequent to abandonment of the gold standard (Shaikh and Ahmet Tonak 1994) and rising energy costs sent prices skyward, while at the same time steep unemployment deepened the effects of high inflation for workers and their families. Big corporations eliminated jobs and factories in high-wage heavy industries (e.g., auto, steel, rubber), decimating entire regions of the country and emptying cities of wealth and people. Even higher unemployment plagued farmworkers and timber, fishing, mining, and other rural workers. Landowners' revenues did not keep up with the cost of money because of changing production processes and product markets, as well as seemingly "natural" disasters. Defaults displaced both large and smaller farmers and other kinds of rural producers from their devalued lands, with the effect that land and rural industry ownership sped up the century-long tendency to concentrate (Gilmore 1998).

Urban dwellers left cities, looking for new jobs, cheaper housing,[7] or whiter communities, and new suburban residential and industrial districts developed as center-cities crumbled. Those left behind were stuck in space, their

mobility hampered by the frictions of diminished political and economic power. As specific labor markets collapsed, entire cohorts of modestly educated men and women – particularly people of color, but also poor white people – lost employment and saw household income drop (see, for example, Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). Meanwhile, international migrants arrived in the US, pushed and pulled across borders by the same forces producing the US cataclysm.

The state's ability to intervene in these displacements was severely constrained by its waning legitimacy to use existing welfare capacities to mitigate crises. However, what withered is not the abstract geopolitical institution called "the state," but rather the shortlived *welfare* partner to the ongoing *warfare* state (Melman 1974). Unabsorbed accumulations from the 1973–7 recession lay the groundwork for additional surpluses idled in the 1981–4 recession, and again in 1990–4, as the furious integration of some worlds produced the terrifying disintegration of others.

Prison Expansion

Many map the new geography according to the gross capital movements we call "globalization." This chapter proposes a different cartographic effort, which is to map the political geography of the contemporary United States by positing at the center the site where state-building is least contested, yet most class based and racialized: the prison. A prison-centered map shows dynamic connections among (1) criminalization, (2) imprisonment, (3) wealth transfer between poor communities, (4) disfranchisement, and (5) migration of state and non-state practices, policies, and capitalist ventures that all depend on carcerality as a basic state-building project. These are all forms of structural adjustment, and have interregional, national, and international consequences. In other words, if economics lies at the base of the prison system, its growth is a function of politics not mechanics.

The political geography of criminal law in the United States is a mosaic of state statutes overlaid by juridically distinct federal law. Although no single lawmaking body determines crimes and their consequences, there are trends that more than 52 legislative bodies have followed and led each other along over the past two decades. The trends center on (1) making previously non-criminal behavior criminal, (2) increasing sentences for old and new crimes, and (3) refiguring minor offenses as major ones. More than 70 percent of new convicts in 1999 were sentenced for non-violent crimes, with drug convictions in the plurality – 30 percent of new state prisoners and 60 percent of all federal prisoners (Gainsborough and Mauer 2000). Even what counts as "violence" has broadened over this period.[8] The summary effect of these trends has been a general convergence toward ineluctable and long prison terms.

The weight of new and harsher laws falls on poor people in general and especially people of color – who are disproportionately poor. Indigenous people, and people of African descent (citizens and immigrants), are the most criminalized groups. Their rate of incarceration climbed steeply over the past twenty years, while economic opportunity for modestly educated people fell drastically and state programs for income guarantees and job creation withered under both Republican and Democratic administrations (Gilmore 1998). Citizen and immigrant Latinos in collapsing primary or insecure secondary labor markets have experienced intensified incarceration; and there has been a steady increase in citizen and immigrant Asian and Pacific Islanders in prison and jail (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). Finally, at the same time that revisions to federal law have curtailed constitutional protections for non-citizens accused of crimes and for all persons convicted of crimes, immigration law has adopted criminalization as a weapon to control cross-border movement and to disrupt settlement of working people who are non-elite long-distance migrants (Palafox 2001).

Does the lawmaking and prison building fury mean there's more crime? Although data are difficult to compare because of changes in categories, the best estimate for crime as a driving force of prison expansion shows it to account for little more than 10 percent of the increase. Rather, it is a greater propensity to lock people up, as opposed to people's greater propensity to do old or new illegal things, that accounts for about 90 percent of US prison and jail growth since 1980. People who are arrested are more likely now than twenty years ago to be detained pending trial; and those convicted are more likely to be sentenced to prison or jail, and for longer terms than earlier cohorts (Blumstein and Beck 1999).

A counter-intuitive proposition might also help further understanding of why there are so many US residents in prison. The lock-up punishment imperative must be positively correlated with lock-up space. Of course, legislative bodies can make any number of laws requiring prison terms, and they can, in theory, drastically overcrowd prisons and then build new prisons to correct for non-compliance with constitutional, if not international (UN 1976), custody standards . However, if one scrutinizes the temporality of prison growth in California, the largest US state, one sees that lawmaking expanding criminalization followed, rather than led, the historically unprecedented building boom the state embarked on in the early 1980s. And the inception of the building boom followed, rather than led, significant, well-reported, reductions in crime (Gilmore 1998, forthcoming). A similar pattern holds true for the other leading prison state, Texas (Ekland-Olsen 1992; Kaplan, Schiraldi, and Ziedenberg 2000). The new structures are built on surplused land that is no longer a factor in productive activity. Virtually all new prisons have been sited in rural areas, where dominant monopoly or oligopoly capitals have either closed down or, through centralization and/or mechanization, reorganized their participation in the economy.

In search of new prison sites, state prison agencies and private prison entrepreneurs (to whom we shall return) present lock-up facilities as local economic development drivers. Recent quantitative and qualitative research in the US (Hooks et al. forthcoming; Gilmore 1998, forthcoming) demonstrates that prisons do not produce the promised outcomes for a number of reasons. New prison employees do not live in amenities-starved towns where prisons go, while 60–95 percent of new prison jobs go to outsiders. Prisons have no industrial agglomeration effects. The preponderance of local institutional purchases is for utilities which are usually extra-locally owned. Locally owned retail and service establishments such as restaurants are displaced by multinational chains, which drain already scant profits from the locality.

When a prison site is authorized, land values increase amid the euphoria of expected growth, but after construction values drop again. Anticipatory development – particularly new and rehabilitated housing – fails, leaving homeowners (especially the elderly) with their sole asset effectively devalued due to increased vacancies. Renters bear higher fixed costs because of hikes during the shortlived construction boom. As a result, prisons can actually intensify local economic bifurcation.

At the same time, prisons produce a local economy dependent on constant statehouse politicking to maintain inflows of cash. In one mayor's words: "Beds. We're always lobbying for more beds." "More beds" means more prisoners (Huling 1999). Most prisoners come from urban areas, where the combination of aggressive law-enforcement practices (Bayley 1985) and greater structural strains (Laub 1983) produces higher arrest and conviction rates than in rural areas (Gilmore 1998); suburbia is following urban trends (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000).

The movement of prisoners is, in effect, a wealth transfer between poor communities, and there isn't enough wealth in the sending community to create real economic growth in the receiving community (Huling 2000b; Gilmore forthcoming). Taxes and other benefits that are spatially allocated on a per capita basis count prisoners where they are held, not where they are from (Huling 2000a). When prisoners' families make long trips to visit, they spend scarce but relatively elastic funds in motels and eating establishments. Towns disappointed by the lack of prison-induced real growth console themselves with these meager rewards, although modest tax subventions and families' expenditures hardly constitute an income tide to lift ships. Prisons also provide localities with free prisoner labor for public works and beautification, which can displace local low-wage workers.

Global Implications

Throughout the globalizing world, states at all scales are working to renovate their ability to be powerful actors in rapidly changing landscapes of accumulation. Already-existing capacities, antagonisms, and agreements are

the raw materials of political renovation; embedded in renovation work, then, is the possibility (although by no means *certainty*) that already-existing frictions of distance may be intensified. The rise of prisons in the United States is a potentially prime factor in future "globalization circulation models" because prison-building is state-building at its least contested, and the US is a prime exporter of ideologies and systems. The transfer of social control methods, in times of political economic crisis, is not new. A century ago, Jim Crow, apartheid, racist science, eugenics, and other precursors to twentieth-century hypersegregation, exclusion, and genocide took ideological and material form and globalized in conjunction with technology transfers and dreams of democracy (cf. Blaut 1994).

In the current period the legitimizing growth of state social control apparatuses productively connects with the needs of those who struggle to gain or keep state power. Such political actors (whether parties, corporations, industrial sectors, or other kinds of interest groups makes no difference) are vulnerable to the arguments of private entrepreneurs and public technocrats about how states *should* function in the evolving global arena, when the norm has become neoliberal minimalism. Increased coercive control within jurisdictions is, as we have seen in the US context, one way to manage the effects of organized abandonment. At the same time, the struggle for *international* sovereignty in the context of "postcolonial" globalization can, and often does, feature a rush to institutional conformity – which today includes expanded criminalization, policing, and prisons. As a result, new or renovated state structures are often grounded in the exact same fatal power-difference couplings (e.g., racism, sexism, homophobia) that radical anti-colonial activists fought to expunge from the social order (Fanon 1961; Alexander 1994).

In other words, structural adjustment – most ordinarily associated with shifts in how states intervene in the costs of everyday-life basic-goods subsidies, wage rules, and other benefits – flags not only what states stop doing, but also what states do instead.[9] Policing and lawmaking are internationally articulated, via professional and governmental associations (see, for example, Bayley 1985), and the pressures of international finance capitalists (whether commercial or not-for-profit) seeking to secure predictable returns on investments. In short, while not all countries in the world rush to emulate the United States, the very kinds of state-based contigencies and opportunities that help explain US prison expansion operate elsewhere (see, for example, Huggins 1998; Chevigny 1995).

US prison expansion has other broad effects. While most US prisons and jails are publicly owned and operated, the trend toward public service privatization means firms work hard to turn the deprivation of freedom for 2,000,000 into profit-making opportunities for shareholders. Success rates differ across jursidictions, but privatized market share, currently about 6 percent, grew 25–35 percent each year during the 1990s (Greene 2001; Austin and Coventry 2001). The largest firms doing this work also promote

privatization in such disparate places as the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Australia (Sudbury 2000).

Public and private entities package and market prison design, construction, and fund-development; they also advocate particular kinds of prison-space organization and prisoner management techniques. The "security housing unit" (SHU), a hyper-isolation "control unit" cell condemned by international human rights organizations, is widely used in the United States. The US imported the SHU from the former West Germany, which developed it as a death penalty surrogate to destroy the political will and physical bodies of radical activists. The US has both the death penalty and the SHU, and promotes control units abroad (Davis and Gordon 1998). At the end of 2000 more than 10,000 prisoners throughout Turkey participated in a hunger strike to protest spatial reconfiguration from dormitories to cell-based "American"-style prison, with a particular focus on the punitive SHU (Prison Focus 2001).

Exported structures and relationships can take the form of indirect as well as deliberately patterned effects. In addition to the transfer of wealth between poor places, prison produces the political transfer of electoral power through formal disfranchisement of felons. While elections and politics are not identical, the power to vote has been central to struggles for self-determination for people kept from the polls by the frictions of terror and law throughout the world. In the United States Black people fought an entire century (1865–1965) for the vote. As of 1998, there were nearly 4 million felony-disfranchised adults in the country, of whom 1.37 million are of African descent (Fellner and Mauer 1998). The voter effect of criminalization returns the US to the era when white supremacist statutes barred millions from decision-making processes; today, lockout is achieved through lock-up.

The 2000 US presidential election, strangely decided by the Supreme Court rather than voters, was indirectly determined by massive disfranchisement. George W. Bush Jr. won Florida, and therefore the White House and the most powerful job on the planet, by fewer than 500 votes. Yet 204,600 Black Floridians were legally barred from voting; additionally, many others of all races who tried to vote could not because their names appeared on felon lists. Had felons not been disfranchised, candidate Bush would have lost; however, candidate Albert Gore's party shares equal responsibility with Bush's for creating widespread disfranchisement, and could not protest on that front. Thus, the structural effects of racism significantly shape the electoral sphere with ineluctably global consequences for financial (G8), industrial (WTO and GATT), environmental (Kyoto), and warfare (NATO; Star Wars) policies.

Conclusion

As exercised through criminal laws that target certain kinds of people in places disorganized by globalization's adjustments, racism is structural – not individual nor incidental. The sturdy curtain of US racism enables and

veils the complex economic, political, and social processes of prison expansion. Through prison expansion and prison export, both US and non-US racist practices can become determining forces in places nominally "free" of white supremacy. Indeed, as with the twentieth, the problem of the twenty-first century is freedom; and racialized lines continue powerfully, although not exclusively, to define freedom's contours and limits.

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Notes

1   Some theorists prefer the plural – racisms – to underscore how there is not a single universal practice. I use the singular because racism, like other forms of violence, tends to produce the same outcomes regardless of technique: premature death and other life-limiting inequalities.

2   The articulations of race and space – as and through multiscalar hierarchies of colonialism, slavery, and other relations of unfreedom – are more evident in some contexts than in others. For some examples of how race becomes both amplified and entrenched, see CCCS (1982) and Mitchell (2000).

3   Susan Christopherson's chapter on gender (chapter 15, this volume) provides an exemplary chart for doing this exercise on a global scale.

4   I use "friction of distance" to theorize the metaphorical and material drag coefficients that differentially impede the movements of people, things, relationships, and ideas across geometric as well as social space. See Isard (1956) for his thoroughly *unmetaphorical* introduction of the term as the regional science's key revision of neoclassical economics.

5   2,000,000 does not include persons detained with or without charge by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service.

6   While there was plenty of racism and sexism outside the south and west, the structure of New Deal social welfare programs equalized across a differentiated landscape a series of perspectives about eligibility, need, and merit that became common sense (see, for example, Mink 1995)

7   About 65 percent of US households are owner-occupied. When the data are broken down by race, we see a different picture: for example, only about 45 percent of Black households are owner-occupied, because of federally mandated racist lending criteria as well as lower-than-average incomes (Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).

8   The meaning of violence used to define racism in this chapter (see note 1) is far narrower than the meaning of violence used by current lawmakers to expand punishment.

9   Rarely, if ever, does a delegitimated state, or state-fraction, simply disappear.